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Abstract
In the fast-growing smart devices, Android is the most
popular OS, and due to its attractive features, mobility,
ease of use, these devices hold sensitive information such
as personal data, browsing history, shopping history, fi-
nancial details, etc. Therefore, any security gap in these
devices means that the information stored or accessing
the smart devices are at high risk of being breached by
the malware. These malware are continuously growing
and are also used for military espionage, disrupting the
industry, power grids, etc. To detect these malware, tra-
ditional signature matching techniques are widely used.
However, such strategies are not capable to detect the
advanced Android malicious apps because malware de-
veloper uses several obfuscation techniques. Hence, re-
searchers are continuously addressing the security issues
in the Android based smart devices. Therefore, in this
paper using Drebin benchmark malware dataset we ex-
perimentally demonstrate how to improve the detection
accuracy by analyzing the apps after grouping the col-
lected data based on the permissions and achieved 97.15%
overall average accuracy. Our results outperform the ac-
curacy obtained without grouping data (79.27%, 2017),
Arp, et al. (94%, 2014), Annamalai et al. (84.29%, 2016),
Bahman Rashidi et al. (82%, 2017)) and Ali Feizollah, et
al. (95.5%, 2017). The analysis also shows that among
the groups, Microphone group detection accuracy is least
while Calendar group apps are detected with the highest
accuracy, and for the best performance, one shall take 80-
100 features.
Keywords: Android Malicious Apps; Machine Learning;
Static Malware Analysis; Dangerous Permissions
1 Introduction
The attractive features and mobility of smart devices have
drastically changed the today’s environment. Many func-
tionalities of these devices are similar to the traditional
information technology system, which can also access en-
terprises applications and data, enabling employees to do
their work remotely. Hence the security risks are not only
limited to Bring Your Own Smart Device (BYOSD) sce-
narios but also for the devices which are adopted on an
ad hoc basis. Therefore, any security gap in these devices
means that the information stored or accessing smart de-
vices are at high risk of being breached. The recent at-
tack shows that the security features in these devices are
not as par to completely stop the adversary [23]. Hence
smart devices are becoming an attractive target for the
online criminal, and they are investing more and more for
the sophisticated attacks viz. ransomware or to steal the
valuable personal data from the user device.
In the smart devices, Android is the most popular oper-
ating systems and are connected through the internet ac-
cessing billions of online websites (an estimate shows that
5 out of 6 mobile phones are working on Android OS [25]).
Its popularity is basically due to its open source, exponen-
tial increase in the Android supported apps, third-party
distribution, free rich SDK and the very much suited Java
language. In this growing Android apps market, it is very
hard to know which apps are malicious. As per Statista
[24], there are approximately two million apps at the Play
Store of Google and also many third-party apps available
for the Android users. Hence potential of the malicious
apps or malware entering these systems is now at never
seen before levels, not only to the normal users but also for
military espionage, disrupting the industry, power grids
(e.g., Duqu, StuxNet), etc. [21]. In this, Quick Heal
Threat Research Labs in the 3rd quarter of 2015 reported
that they had received ∼ 4.2 × 105 malware per day for
the Android and Windows platforms [15].
To detect the malware, traditional approaches are
based on the signature matching, which is efficient from
a time perspective but not relevant for the detection of
advanced malicious apps and continuously growing zero-
day malware attack [9]. Also, to evade the signature-
based techniques, malware developer uses several obfus-
cation techniques. However, to detect the Android mali-
cious apps, time to time, a number of static and dynamic
methods have been proposed [2], [16], [11], [5]. But, it ap-
pears that the proposed methods are not good enough to
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2 RELATED WORK 2
effectively detect the advanced malware [21] in the fast-
growing internet and Android based smart devices usage
into our daily life. Hence researchers are continuously ad-
dressing the security issues in the Android based smart de-
vices. Therefore, in this paper, for the effective detection
of Android malicious apps with high accuracy, we classi-
fied the apps after grouping the collected data based on
permissions. The remaining paper is organized as follows.
In next Section, we discuss the related work. Section 3
describes how the collected Android apps are grouped,
Section 4 explains the feature selection approach, while
Section 5 describes our approach for the effective detec-
tion of Android malicious apps and the obtained experi-
mental results. Finally, Section 6 contains the conclusion.
2 Related work
In both the two main methods (static and dynamic) used
for the classification of malicious apps, selected classifiers
are trained with a known dataset to differentiate the be-
nign and malicious apps. In this, Arp. et al. achieved 94%
detection accuracy by generating a joint vector space us-
ing AndroidManifest.xml file and the disassembled code
[2]. Seo, et al. also used the same static features viz. per-
missions, dangerous APIs, and keywords associated with
malicious behaviors to detect potential malicious apps
[19]. Based on a set of characteristics derived from bi-
nary and metadata Gonzalez, et al. proposed a method
DroidKin, which can detect the similarity among the apps
under various levels of obfuscation [6]. Quentin et al., uses
op-code sequences to detect the malicious apps. However,
their approaches are not suitable to detect the malware
which are completely different [8].
In 2015, Smita Naval, et al. proposed an approach
by quantifying the information-rich call sequences to de-
tect the malicious binaries and claimed that the model
is less vulnerable to call-injection attacks [12]. In 2016,
Jae-wook jang, et al. proposed Andro-Dumpsys, a hy-
brid malware detection approach based on the similar-
ity between the malware creator-centric and malware-
centric information. Their experimental analysis shows
that Andro-Dumpsys can classify the malware families
with good True Positive (TP ) and True Negative (TN),
and are also capable of identifying zero-day threats [7].
Luca Caviglione, et. al. obtained 95.42% accuracy us-
ing neural networks and decision trees [12]. Sanjeev Das,
et al. proposed GuardOl (a hardware-enhanced architec-
ture), a combined approach using processor and field pro-
grammable gate array for online malware detection. Their
approach detects 46% of malware for the first 30% of ex-
ecution, while 97% on complete execution [4]. Saracino,
et al., proposed a host-based malware detection system
called MADAM which simultaneously analyzes and cor-
relates the features at four levels to detect the malware
[18]. Gerardo Canfora, et al. analyzed two methods to de-
tect Android malware, first was based on Hidden Markov
Model, while the 2nd one exploits structural entropy and
found that the structural entropy can identify the mal-
ware family more correctly [3]. Annamalai et al. proposed
DroidOl for the effective online detection of malware us-
ing passive-aggressive classifier and achieved an accuracy
of 81.29% [11].
Recently in 2017, Ali Feizollah, et al. evaluated the
effectiveness of Android Intents (explicit and implicit) as
a distinguishing feature for identifying malicious applica-
tions. They conducted experiments using a dataset con-
taining 7406 applications comprising 1846 clean and 5560
infected applications. They achieved the detection rate
of 91% using Android Intent and 83% using Android per-
mission. With the combination of both the features, they
have achieved 95.5% detection rate [5]. Nikola et. al.
estimated F-measure (does not take account of correctly
classified benign apps) of 95.1% and 89% by classifying
the apps based on source code and permission respec-
tively [10]. Bahman Rashidi et al. experimented with the
Drebin benchmark malware dataset and shown that their
model can accurately assess the risk levels of malicious
applications and provide adaptive risk assessment based
on user input and can find malware with the maximum
accuracy of 82% [16].
3 Grouping of Android Apps
In Android, apps run as a separate process with unique
user/group ID and operate in an application sandbox
so that apps execution can be kept in isolation from
other apps and the system. Hence, to access the user
data/resources from the system, apps need additional
capabilities that are not provided by the basic sand-
box. To access data/resources which are outside of the
sandbox, the apps have to explicitly request the needed
permission. Depending on the sensitivity of data/area,
requested permission may be granted automatically by
the system or ask the user to approve or reject the
request. In Android, these permissions can be found in
Manifest.permission file e.g. to use the call service in an
Android app, it should specify:
< manifestxmlns :
Android = “http : //schemas.Android.com/apk/res/Android”
package = ”com.Android.app.callApp” >
< uses− permissionAndroid :
name = “android.permission.CALL PHONE”/ >
...
< /manifest >
In total there are 235 permissions out of which 163 are
hardware accessible and remaining are for user informa-
tion access [13]. In terms of security, all these permissions
can be put into two categories i.e. normal and dangerous
permissions [1]. Therefore it will be important to study
the classification of Android malicious apps after group-
ing them into dangerous and normal/other permissions
(Table 1). Hence in this paper to improve the overall
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average detection accuracy of Android malicious apps we
use Drebin [2] 5531 benchmark malware dataset and 4235
benign apps available at Google play store. Our analy-
sis shows that the Drebin dataset does not contain any
apps which need body sensors permission. Therefore we
ignored the Sensors group in our experimental analysis
and made total nine groups (eight groups of dangerous
permissions and one group of normal/other permissions)
for the detection of Android apps.
Group Permissions
Calendar Read calendar and write calendar.
Camera Use camera.
Contacts Read contacts, write contacts and
get contacts.
Location Access fine location and
Access coarse location.
Microphone Record audio.
Phone Read phone state, call phone,
read call logs, add voicemail,
use sip and process outgoing calls.
Sensors Use body sensors
SMS Send SMS, receive SMS, read SMS
receive WAP push and receive MMS.
Storage Read external storage and
write external storage.
Table 1: Dangerous permissions groups of the Android
apps
4 Feature Selection
For the detection of Android malicious apps, feature se-
lection plays a vital role, not only to represent the tar-
get concept but also to speed-up the learning and test-
ing process. In this, often datasets are represented by
many features. However, few of them may suffice to im-
prove the concept quality, and also limiting the features
will speed-up the classification. The Android apps can be
represented as a vector of 256 opcodes [14], and some of
these opcodes can be used as features for the effective and
efficient detection of Android malicious apps. Therefore,
to find the prominent features which can represent the
target concept, opcodes from the collected Android apps
are extracted as follows
• The .apk files (Android apps) has been decompiled
by using freely available apktool.
• From the decompiled data, we kept only the .smali
files and discarded other data, and then
• Opcodes are extracted from the .smali files.
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Figure 1: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the CALENDAR group.
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Figure 2: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the Camera group.
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Figure 3: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the COTACTS group.
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Figure 4: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the Location group.
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Figure 5: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the Microphone group.
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Figure 6: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the OTHER group.
We studied the occurrence of opcodes in benign and
malicious apps separately in each formed group, and com-
puted the opcode occurrences difference between them.
We observe that the opcode occurrence between malicious
and benign apps among the formed group differ signifi-
cantly (group-wise top 50 opcodes whose occurrence sign-
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Figure 7: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the Phone group.
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Figure 8: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the SMS group.
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Figure 9: Top 50 opcodes occurrence difference between be-
nign and malicious apps in the Storage group.
ificantly (group-wise top 50 opcodes whose occurrence sig-
nificantly differ are shown in Figures 1 - 9 for the Cal-
endar, Camera, Contacts, Location, Microphone, Others,
Phone, SMS, and Storage group respectively). Also, we
find that the opcode occurrence in any group differs sig-
nificantly when compared with the opcode occurrence ob-
tained without forming the groups [22]. Hence, the final
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features are selected after ordering the opcodes by their
occurrence difference in each group (Algorithm 1) and
used it for the detection of Android malicious apps.
Algorithm 1 : Feature Selection
INPUT: Pre-processed data
NB: No. of benign apps, NM: No. of malicious apps,
n: Total number of features required.
OUTPUT: List of features
BEGIN
for all benign and malicious apps do
Find the sum of frequencies fi of each opcode Op and
normalize it.
FB(Opj) = (
∑
fi(Opj))/NB
FM (Opj) = (
∑
fi(Opj))/NM
end for
for all opcode Opj do
D(Opj) = |FB(Opj)− FM (Opj)|
end for
return n number of prominent opcodes as features with
high D(Op).
Figure 10: Flow chart for the detection of Android malicious
apps by grouping the data.
5 Classification of Malicious Apps
Ashu et al. [22] without grouping the data nor talking
the apps permission investigated the top five classifiers
viz. FT, RF, LMT, NBT and J48 for the classification
of apps and reported that the FT is the best classifier
and can detect the malicious apps with 79.27% accuracy
[22]. Hence to improve the detection accuracy in this pa-
per, first we grouped the apps based on the permissions
and then classify the malicious apps using prominent op-
code as the features (Figure 10). For the classification,
Groups Train Train Test Test Total No.
malware benign malware benign of apps
Calendar 59 57 14 14 144
Camera 179 423 44 106 752
Contacts 1073 356 268 89 1786
Location 1538 68 383 18 2007
Microphone 95 218 23 55 391
Others 110 891 27 223 1251
Phone 3981 1453 986 373 6793
SMS 2712 239 677 60 3688
Storage 2923 837 730 210 4700
Table 2: Number of benign and Android malicious apps
used for training and testing the classifiers.
the detail distribution (No. of training and testing ma-
licious/benign apps, No. of apps in the group used for
the classification) of the total collected dataset is given in
Table 2. For the group-wise classification, we have used
Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA).
On the basis of studies [17] [20], we selected the same
classifier (FT, RF, LMT, NBT, and J48) for the clas-
sification, but prominent features, training, and testing
data are taken from the formed group only (Table 2). To
measure the goodness of trained models, we evaluate the
detection accuracy given by the equation
Accuracy(%) =
True Positive + True Negative
Total No. of Android Apps
× 100
Where True Positive/Negative is the Android mali-
cious/benign apps correctly classified [22].
The performance of the classifier has been investigated
for each group by taking randomly 20% of the collected
data (other than the training) with 20 - 200 best fea-
tures incrementing 20 features at each step and the result
obtained are shown in Figures 11 - 19 for the Calendar,
Camera, Contacts, Location, Microphone, Others, Phone,
SMS, and Storage group respectively.
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Figure 11: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the CALENDAR group.
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Figure 12: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Camera group.
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Figure 13: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Contacts group.
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Figure 14: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Location group.
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Figure 15: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Microphone group.
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Figure 16: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Others group.
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Figure 17: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Phone group.
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Figure 18: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the SMS group.
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Figure 19: Detection accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers for the Storage group.
No. of J48 RF NBT FT LMT
Features
20 93.69 95.01 90.37 93.32 94.28
40 95.28 96.26 92.26 93.78 93.45
60 95.51 96.10 94.24 94.01 94.31
80 94.83 96.32 94.44 95.38 95.46
100 95.15 96.24 94.41 95.43 85.47
120 94.48 95.96 92.96 94.57 94.23
140 95.12 96.08 93.68 93.53 94.76
160 95.39 95.16 94.97 95.16 94.29
180 94.94 95.73 93.93 95.18 94.56
200 94.71 95.78 93.24 94.98 94.71
Maximum 95.51 96.32 94.97 95.43 95.47
Minimum 93.69 95.01 90.37 93.32 93.45
Table 3: Average accuracy obtained by the five classifiers.
The average accuracy obtained by the selected classi-
fier are shown in Table 3. Here, the average accuracy
means the sum of accuracy obtained by the classifier in
the individual group with a fixed number of features di-
vided by the total number of groups. The analysis shows
Groups Best Accu- Features TN TP
Classifier racy Required
Calendar RF 100.00 20 1.00 1.00
Camera FT 96.67 40 0.93 0.98
Contacts RF 96.08 120 0.99 0.89
Location FT 99.25 60 0.99 0.94
Microphone FT 93.59 120 0.87 0.96
Others LMT 96.80 160 0.85 0.98
Phone RF 96.54 60 0.98 0.92
SMS FT 98.51 100 1.00 0.80
Storage LMT 96.91 140 0.99 0.88
Table 4: Group-wise maximum accuracy, TP and TN ob-
tained by the classifiers.
that RF average detection accuracy is best among the
five classifiers and fluctuates least with the number of
features, whereas NBT performance is worst and fluctu-
ate maximum with the number of features. However, the
maximum average accuracy obtained by the selected five
classifiers does not fluctuate much (94.97% - 96.32%) but
minimum average accuracy fluctuation is high (90.37% -
95.01%), and for the best performance one shall take top
80 - 100 features, for the training and testing. The best
accuracy obtained by the classifier in all the groups are
given in Table 4. We find that the detection accuracy
is maximum in the Calendar group and minimum in the
Microphone group obtained by FT and RF classifier re-
spectively. The overall average maximum accuracy comes
to 97.15%, which is very much better than then the ob-
tained accuracy without grouping and taking permissions
into account [22] and Arp, et. al. (94%, 2014), Anna-
malai et. al. (84.29%, 2016), Bahman Rashidi et. al.
(82%, 2017), Ali Feizollah, et. al. (95.5%, 2017) (Figure
20). In terms of TP i.e. detection rate of malicious apps,
the Calendar group are best classified by RF and SMS
group are least by FT, while in terms of TN i.e. benign
detection rate, Calendar, and SMS group are best classi-
fied with RF and FT classifier respectively, while Others
group containing normal permissions is best classified by
the LMT classifier. The group-wise results of TP and TN
obtained by the classifiers which give the best accuracy
are shown in Table 4.
 75
 80
 85
 90
 95
 100
Bahman Rashidi, et. al. 2017 Annamalai, et. al. 2016 Arp, et. al. 2014 Ali Feizollah, et. al. 2017 Our Approach
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 →
 
Figure 20: Comparisons of accuracy achieved by us with four
other authors.
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6 Conclusion
For the smart devices users, millions of Android apps are
available at Google Play store and by the third party.
Some of these available apps may be malicious. To de-
fend the threat/attack from these malicious apps, a timely
counter-measures has to be developed. Therefore, in
this paper using Drebin benchmark malware dataset we
group-wise analyzed the collected data based on permis-
sions and experimentally demonstrated how to improve
the detection accuracy of Android malicious apps and
achieved 97.15% average accuracy. The obtained results
outperformed the accuracy achieved by without group-
ing the data (79.27%, 2016), Arp, et al. (94%, 2014),
Annamalai et al. (84.29%, 2016), Bahman Rashidi et
al. (82%, 2017)) and Ali Feizollah, et al. (95.5%, 2017).
The outperformance of our approach with the compared
author results is basically due to the use of logic of the
apps resides in the .smalli file and developing nine dif-
ferent models for the classification. Among the groups,
the Microphone group detection accuracy is least while
Calendar group apps are detected with maximum accu-
racy and for the best performance, one shall take top 80
- 100 features. In term of TP i.e. detection rate of mali-
cious apps, Calendar group is best classified by RF, and
SMS group is least by FT, while in terms TN i.e. be-
nign detection rate, Calendar, and SMS group are best
classified by RF and FT classifier respectively, while Oth-
ers group containing normal permissions is best classified
by the LMT classifier. It appears that group-wise de-
tection of Android malicious apps will be efficient than
without grouping the data. Hence, for the efficient clas-
sification of apps, in-depth study is required to optimize
the feature selection, identifying the best-suited classifier
for the group-by-group analysis. In this direction, work
is in progress and will be reported elsewhere.
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